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Article 18

The Quinlan Case
Dennis J. Horan

This is an expanded version of
a paper presented to the Medicine and Law Committee of the
American Bar Association, Atlanta, Ga. in August, 1976.
Horan, an attorney, is an instructor in law at the University
of Chicago Law School, chairman of the Right to Live/Right
to Die Committee of the American Bar Association, and coauthor and co-editor of Abortion
and Social Justice, published by
Sheed and Ward.
Although its importance cannot be overestimated, the decision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in the matter of Karen
Quinlan 1 bears little or no resemblance to the newspaper
accounts of the case. Its importance is related more to the
impact of the media than the
logic of the opinion. In its opinion of March 31, 1976 the New
Jersey Supreme Court really
addressed two rather diverse
topics : (1) the Karen Quinlan
case, and (2) the right of privacy
in terminal illness. Whether it
was necessary to discuss the latter in order to decide the former
is questionable, and is a question
which will be debated in the law
reviews .
The judgment in the case is
very narrow and is in sharp con168

trast to the wide breadth of
issues discussed in the opinion.
The judgment is contained in the
last three pages of the opinion
entitled "Declaratory Relief." In
those pages the Court declared
that upon the concurrence of the
guardian and family of Karen the
life support apparatus being administered to her (a Bennett Respirator) could be discontinued,
but on certain conditions. These
conditions were : (1) the concurrence of the responsible attending physicians who must conclude that there is no reasonable
possibility of Karen 's ever emerging from her present comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient
state; and (2) the concurrence
and agreement by a hospital
ethics committee that there is no
reasonable possibility of Karen's
ever emerging from her present
comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state.
Thereafter, withdrawal of the
life support systems under those
conditions shall be without any
civil or criminal liability on the
part of any participant, whether
guardian, physician, hospital or
others .
The Court then remanded the
case to the trial court for implementation of certain narrow decisions: (1) to discharge the present guardian, and (2) to appoint
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the father, Joseph Quinlan, as
guardian with full power to make
decisions with regard to the identityof Karen's treating physicians.
The narrowness of the actual
Declaratory Relief is to be contrasted with the breadth of the
body of the opinion which addresses itself to a whole series of
issues, the discussion of which
was not essential or even necessary for the determination of the
case. I contend that the same
decision as was reached by the
Court could have also been
reached by the Court merely by
applying current medical-legal
law, without the necessity of introducing such issues as the right
of privacy or substitute judgment. The mischief these concepts will create remains to be
seen. 2 In view of the post-decretal history of the case, and in
view of Karen's survival for a
lengthy period of time after removal from the respirator, my
conclusions seem even more apt. 3
The court brushed aside Mr.
Quinlan's contention that his First
Amendment rights of religious
iJeliefs were impinged upon . Nor
did the Court recognize an independent parental right of religious freedom to support the relief requested. Similarly the
Court disposed of the Quinlan's
argument based upon cruel and
unusual punishment.
The Court did find in the constitutional right of privacy a right
to reject medical treatment. Because of Karen's incompetency
and her inability to exercise that
right, the Court concluded that
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Karen's right of privacy may be
asserted on her behalf by her
guardian "under the peculiar circumstances here present."4 The
court thus chose to decide the
case on constitutional grounds
rather than attempting a resolution of the issues on current
legal-medical principles. My
thesis is that the case could have
been decided and the same result
reached without resorting to constitutional rights, and in particular the right of privacy.
Resorting to constitutional
grounds means that the Court's
holding cannot be changed or
altered by the legislature. A constitutional amendment would be
required . This can be a most difficult state of affairs in the resolution of legal-moral-medical
problems, since it forecloses further social experimentation
through legislation of other solutions to the legal dilemmas which
resuscitation poses . Alternative
solutions to profound legal problems such as these should not be
foreclosed by the premature use
of constitutional grounds. For
the same reasons, resort should
first be had by the Court to legalmedical precedents rather than
constitutional principles . The law
is only now beginning to cope
with these profound medicallegal problems, and haste in decision-making which may produce
constitutional solutions which are,
practically speaking, henceforth
unalterable, should be avoided.
The right to refuse medical
treatment does not need constitutional support. A physician
169

may not render treatment without consent except in emergency
situations. The fact that consent
is necessary has never been considered to need statutory or constitutional support. The right to
reject medical treatment exists as
a corollary to the necessity for
consent to any touching. A competent person has the right to
refuse medical treatment, not as
a constitutional right of privacy,
but as a corollary of the common
law tort rule that no one may
treat him or her without that
consent. This aspect of the right
of privacy (refusal of medical
treatment) is not constitutional
in scope under the federal constitution. It obviously exists now as
a constitutional right in New Jersey as a result of the opinion in
the Quinlan case.
In an attempt to limit the
breadth of many of the comments made, the Court concluded several paragraphs of the
opinion with the statement,
"u nd er th e peculiar circumstances here present. "5 Why this
should be repeatedly stated by
the Court is unclear. Perhaps
there was fear of the real nature
of the issues which the Court
knew the public thought was
being decided.
The Court stated that if a
putative decision by Karen to
permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by
natural forces is regarded as a
valuable incident of her right of
privacy (i.e., she has a constitutional right to reject medical
treatment), then it should not be
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discarded solely on the basis that
her condition prevents her conscious exercise of that choice .
S peaking in practicalities, the
Court felt that the only way to
prevent destruction of this right
was to permit the guardian and
family of Karen to render their
best judgment as to whether she
would exercise it in these circumstances. The Court then found
that Karen's right of privacy to
terminate medical treatment
could be asserted in her behalf
by her guardian and family
"under the peculiar circumstances
presented by this record."6
Except in emergency situations where it is presumed, consent is a condition precedent for
the giving of medical treatment.
For minors and incompetents,
consent must be sought from the
parent or guardian. The consent
may be given by them where the
treatment is beneficial, but not
otherwise. For termination of
therapy the rules are similar, but
not the same. All treatment requires consent, but the termination of therapy for medical reasons does not, as long as the patient is not being abandoned by
the physician. As applied to the
situation at hand, these principles mean that resuscitation
therapy may be terminated
where the prognosis for life (not
meaningful life) is very poor and
in the medical judgment of the
attending physician continuation
of the therapy is unwarranted.
Consequently, the New Jersey
Supreme Court need not have
discussed the case as one requiring the application of constituLinacre Quarterly

tional principles. Indeed, in
doing so it has seemingly placed
another burden on the shoulders
of the physician. Presumably he
now cannot terminate resuscitative therapy without the consent
of the parent or guardian.
The Court next discusses what
it labels "the medical factor. "
Under this heading is placed the
most far-reaching and unsettling
aspec t of the case. Accepting the
statement by the physicians in
the case that their decision not
to terminate the use of the respirator as a form of medical
treatment was made according to
prevailing medical practice and
standards, the Court nonetheless
determined that it should re-evaluate the applicability of the medical standards themselves.7 The
Court specifically indicated that
the decision of the physicians in
charge of the case was consistent
with the proofs below as to the
"then"8 existing medical standards and practices. It even indicated that Judge Muir was correct in declining to authorize
withdrawal of the respirator as
the law then stood. Then, the
Court addressed this, th e most
profound issue of the case, in a
classic of unintelligible legal
jargon:
"The question is whether there is
such internal consistency and rationality in the application of such
standards as should warrant their
constituting an inel uctable bar to
the effectuation of substantive relief for plaintiff at the hands of the
Court. We have conclud ed not. "9

In my opinion, this section of
the Quinlan case will have the
most profound effect on medical
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practice in future years. For here
the Court held that it could overrule the medical and moral standards prevailing in the profession
of medicine. Judge Muir had held
to the contrary, i.e., that the
medical standards must be determined by the medical profession
and could not be overruled by
the Court.10 But the New Jersey
Supreme Court took particular
pains to address this issue in a
manner which indicates that it,
the New Jersey Supreme Court,
would determine what the moral,
medical and legal standard is as
applicable to the termination of
resuscitative methods. Lest there
be any doubt about that conclusion, the Court reiterates:
"In summary of the present point
of this opinion , we conclude that
the state of the pertinent standards
and practices which guided the
attending physicians in this matter
is not such as would justify this
Court in deeming itself bound or
controlled thereby in responding
to the case for declaratory relief
established by the parties on the
record before us. "ll

It would be much simpler if
the Court had said that the attending physicians were wrong in
their understanding of the prevailing standard. But the Court
says they were right.llA We
must remember that courts have
not heretofore dictated to physicians as to h ow they will conduct
the practice of their profession.
Even a judicial finding of malpractice usually requires the testimony of another physician that
the applicable standard of medical practice has been breached.
Where expert testimony is not
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necessary, it is because the standard is self-evident or proved without oral testimony. Here , however, a state supreme court has
decreed that a medical standard
which, on the record below, was
apparently accepted by all as the
prevailing standard, can be discarded and replaced by another
seemingly contrary standard.
Yet , even that pronouncement
seems to be at odds with the
holding in the judgment that the
attending physicians cannot turn
off the respirator until both they
and a hospital committee have
decided that the treatment is
hopeless. Such inconsistencies do
not persuade a careful reader of
th e efficacy of the opinion.
Under malpractice laws, what
courts say is the prevailing medical standard becomes normative
for the physician and mandates
his future course of conduct.
The Court also holds that terminating the respirator in this
case would not be criminal homicide because death would be
from existing natural causes.
However, even if it were to be
regarded as homicide, the Court
says it would not be unlawful because " a death resulting from
such an act would not come
within the scope of the homicide
statutes proscribing only the unlawful killing of another."12 The
Court brings the person who
turns off the respirator under the
protection of the consitution by
declaring that the one who exercises the constitutional right of
privacy fo r another under these
circumstances cannot be the subject matter of prosecution if the
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other individual himself would
not be subject to prosecution for
refusing medical treatment.
Then, in a most extraordinary
statement, the Court states: " and
under the circumstances of this
case these same principles would
apply to and negate a valid prosecu tion for attempted suicide
were there still such a crime in
this state." 13 Such a crime, " aiding suicide," is a crime under the
proposed New Jersey Penal
Code. The Court points out that
even if the new criminal code becomes law, " this provision, if enacted, would not be incriminatory in circumstances similar to
those presented in this case. "14 I
have not before seen a court
render a declaratory judgment on
a statute not yet in existence.
The case must be considered
in the light of the facts as presented to the trial court and to
the Supreme Court of New Jersey. At that time it was assumed
by all participants that turning
off the respirator meant almost
immediate death for Karen Quinlan. Consequently, the case was
argued in the trial court and on
appeal as though the act of terminating a form of medical treatment constituted voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. The subsequent history of t he case, and
the fact that Karen Quinlan continues to survive without the aid
of the respirator, has put the case
in its proper perspective . That
perspective is this: the Karen
Quinlan case concerned a medical decision as to whether or not
a certain type of medical therapy
Linacre Quarterly

should be continued in the case.
That judgment should first of all
be a medical judgment made by
the physicians on the case. If the
family concurs with that judgment, well and good. If, however, the family opts for a different form of medical treatment
than the physicians on the case,
the only practical answer is for
the physicians to resign or to fire
the physicians and replace them
with other physicians. This, however, can be most difficult, as
anyone who has been involved in
such a case knows . Few physicians will involve themselves in
taking over a case under those
circumstances. This is seemingly
what has occurred since the
Court's opinion of March 31,
1976. The disagreement between
the attending physicians and the
family precipitated this litigation. In their judgment the attending physicians felt the case
was not medically hopeless, and
they refused to terminate the use
of the respirator. Since the opinion, the same treating physicians
have successfully weaned Karen
from the respirator and she has
been transferred to a nursing
home. Given these basic disagreem ents between physician and
family, who prevails?
Ordinarily one would expect
the physician to resign in the
face of such disagreement. How
can he resign, however, without
arranging for follow-up care (or
be accused of abandonment),
and what other physician wants
to step into such a situation? The
Supreme Court of New Jersey
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solved this dilemma by giving the
guardian (the father) the right to
select the physician, even to the
extent of firing the current
physicians.
But on the important issue the disagreement - it still held
that the successor physicians
must first agree that the case is
hopeless before therapy can be
discontinued. The Court then
added another layer to the problem by requiring a hospital committee to do the same. This is the
most puzzling aspect of the case.
Presumably, the Court assumed
that other physicians would be
found after pUblication of the
opinion who would take the case
and would agree with the Court's
opinion that the mere existence
of a non-cognitive state or nonsapient state (whatever the Court
means) is adequate grounds to
stop the therapy .
Under current medical-legal
principles, the Court had only to
examine the facts and declare
that a physician is authorized
under the standards of medical
practice to discontinue a form of
therapy which in his medical
judgment is useless. He is not
mandated by the law to render
useless treatment, nor does the
standard of medical care require
useless treatment. Under those
circumstances if the treating
physicians have determined that
continued use of the respirator
was useless, then they could decide to discontinue it without
fear of civil or criminal liability.
Thereafter reappointing the parent as guardian with the obvious
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power to discharge the physicians if they disagreed with the
family, was the only required
solution. Whether the family can
then find physicians who agree
with them and will take the case
is a separate issue.
By " useless " is meant that the
continued use of the therapy
cannot and does not improve the
prognosis for recovery. Even if
the therapy is necessary to maintain stab iii ty, such therapy
should not be mandatory where
the ultimate prognosis is hopeless. This does not mean that
ordinary means of life supports,
such as food and drink, can be
discontinued merely because the
ultimate prognosis is hopeless. It
does mean, however, that physicians can use good, practical,
common medical sense in determining whether or not treatment is efficacious and, if it is
not, then cease the treatment.
By "hopeless" is meant that
the prognosis for life (not meaningful life) is very poor. The fact
that someone may not return to
"sapient or cognitive life" may
or may not fulfill the requirement, depending on other medical factors, but in and of itself it
does not. As was said by the
Supreme Court of West Germany:
"Where human li fe exists, human
dignity is present to it ; it is not decisive that the bearer of this dignity
himse lf be conscious of it and
knows personally how to preserve
it."15

It seems that in the Quinlan
case all participants assumed that
just as night follows day , death
would follow the termination of
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the respirator. Subsequent facts
have proved this to be incorrect
and have undermined the force
of this decision. Perhaps, however, subsequent facts have
placed this decision in its proper
perspective. Where the issue is a
medical one, namely the terminati on of useless therapy, that
question is one which should be
decided by the physicians, not
by the courts. All the Court here
had to do was find that such a
medical decision does not violate
the law.
The problem with the Quinlan
case is that, according to the lower court, all the physicians agreed
that the case was not hopeless. If
this is a reasonable medical judgment, then one can only conclude that, in the collective mind
of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, and although unsaid,
either the doctors were factually
wrong in their conclusion or
medically hopeless means " nonsapient or non-cognitive." What
does this mean for the retardate?
If there is a lesson to be
learned from the Quinlan case, it
seems to me that one lesson is
for the court to interfere less
with medicine and to spend more
time analyzing the legal issues involved, and in particular the impact those legal issues will have
on other areas of the law.
Already we see the movement
for the legalization of voluntary
and involuntary euthanasia. Duff
and Campbell have stated their
case for the legalization of involuntary euthanasia in the special care nursery,16 In its proviLinacre Quarterly

sional report of Dec. 16, 1975,
the Council of Europe draft recommendation by the Committee
on Social and Health Questions
opts for both voluntary and involuntary euthanasia of the incurably ill, or even those whose
cerebral functions have irreversibly ceased.17 Certainly the Quinlan case should not be considered
as a step in that direction since
the Court takes great pains to
distinguish between the substituted judgment of a parent or
guardian to terminate medical
treatment for an incompetent
and the deliberate, intentional
taking of another's life. However,
one cannot but express the concern previously stated by Prof.
Yale Kamisar in his famous article that the slippery slope once
begun is indeed difficult to terminate, and where it will terminate is anyone's guess. 18

The second and more important lesson should be learned by
the medical profession . If that
profession wants to avoid interference by the courts it ought to
liaison with the bar to seek cooperation on these difficult issues long before litigation begins.
Such liaison should be permanently institutionalized by the
creation of a standing and funded committee composed of
physicians, lawyers and moralists. This committee should be
funded by the American Bar
Association and the American
Medical Association, although
totally independent of either. It
should have adequate staff.
May, 1977

The committee's main function should be the issuance of
legal-moral-medical "opinions"
on these and similar issues. Such
"opinions" can be the result of
study, research, and even testimony before the committee by
interested persons. The moral
persuasiveness of such "opinions" will depend on the prestige
and impartiality of the committee. Certainly any such committee will experience the usual
problems to which such institutions are heir, but its existence
seems imperative to the current
and future needs of both medicine and law.
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